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THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE OF
PERSONALITY AND IMPERSONALITY:
OFFICE, HONOR, AND THE OATH
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University
Press. 2017. Pp. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper).
Paul Horwitz2
Randy Kozel’s book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of
Precedent, is a splendid accomplishment. It is clarifying in its
treatment of the existing law of precedent, reasonable in its
proposals for modifications of that law, and thoughtful and careful
throughout. More than that, it sparkles. Ideas and apothegms
adorn every page. As the diverse responses in this review
symposium suggest, despite its concision, Settled Versus Right
generates countless questions, befitting both the vital field of law
it treats and the depth and breadth of Kozel’s discussion. The
pleasure and agony consist in selecting just one aspect of the book
for discussion, when it provides such a wealth of material to
choose from.
One key element of Kozel’s book is its identification of
“impersonality” as a central good served by precedent. The
book’s introduction asserts that a key benefit of stare decisis is that
“the potential vacillation of constitutional law following changes
in judicial personnel is replaced by an abiding sense of stability
and impersonality” (p. 18). The book concludes, “Deference to
prior decisions takes the abstract ideal of impersonal judging and
transforms it into something concrete. Judges come and go, but
1. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Notre Dame
Law School.
2. Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to
the participants in the symposium on Randy Kozel’s book held at the University of
Richmond School of Law in April 2017 for questions and discussion, to Kurt Lash and
Jason Mazzone for organizing that event, and to Randy Kozel both for his comments and
for his book, which provided the splendid occasion for that discussion.
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the law remains the law. That is the promise of precedent” (p.
176). Impersonality—as an essential quality of law, a crucial
feature of judging, and a compromise or sacrifice made by
individual judges in the service of a “continuous and impersonal
Court”—is one of the book’s dominant ideals (p. 164).
Such a sacrifice demands a great deal of a judge, or indeed of
any individual. This is especially true in a culture in which the
dominant modes of self-understanding and action do not involve
impersonality, but strong attachments to specific substantive
commitments; individual visions of life, law, and justice; political
commitments and polarization; and other deeply personal views.
In the face of this culture and its powerful motivations, why would
one willingly submerge and sacrifice oneself, and one’s deepest
conceptions of justice, for the sake of a “continuous and
impersonal Court” (p. 164)? Even if doing so is understood to be
the duty of a “good” judge, why settle for dutiful obedience if it
risks sacrificing one’s deepest substantive commitments? Why be
a mere “good” judge, dutifully following precedent, when one can
be a great judge, celebrated for one’s boldness and one’s dramatic
effect on the substance of the law?3 One can understand why
judges often fall short of the mark of impersonality set by Kozel.
Nor is this true only of judges, or of legal officials more
generally. Impersonality is in disrepute throughout our culture
today: our official and professional culture, our popular culture,
and our public discourse. A judge, or some other individual, who
is committed to impersonality or required to strive for it will need
a substantial amount of virtue and character to resist the call of
personality and substantive justice. She will need a strong source
of motivation to supply the energy and restraint needed to persist
in the face of these dominant social, political, and legal currents.
Although I do not doubt that Kozel’s book will be much admired,
I suspect that many readers will resist any edifice of law and
precedent built on a foundation of impersonality. Even those
judges who agree with him will need something more than “the
3. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at
87, N.Y. TIMES: OBITUARIES (April 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/
obituaries/stephen-reinhardt-liberal-lion-of-federal-court-dies-at-87.html (noting the
response of Judge Reinhardt, unquestionably celebrated as a “great” judge by many, to
the large number of reversals he faced at the Supreme Court: “They can’t catch ‘em all”);
id. (quoting a former clerk noting of Judge Reinhardt’s repeated dissents in death penalty
cases that “[I]t was the right thing to do, and that’s what mattered. He wanted his voice
and his objections heard.”).
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loftiest Law Day rhetoric” about “‘the rule of law’” to lash
themselves to the mast of impersonality.4
In this reaction to Kozel’s focus on individual subordination
to the ideal of impersonality, I focus on a vision of judging—or of
any office—that draws on values beyond the constitutional text to
supply the energy and motivation necessary to achieve what
Kozel seeks. That vision is not impersonal, but personal. It uses
personal motivations to tie the individual officeholder to the
“impersonal” features of his or her office. It is not a set of
prescriptions or an instruction manual for what judges should do,
but for who they should be.5 It is virtue- and character-centered
rather than purely institutional, impersonal, or mechanical.6 And,
as both the ancients and the early moderns did, it seeks to ensure
virtue and character in part by tying it to personal motives rather
than hoping that officials or others will be virtuous for the sake of
virtue itself. In short, it seeks to achieve Kozel’s vision of

4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008).
5. This is, I believe, the main distinction between my work and that of Professor
Richard Re, whose excellent scholarship on oaths is concerned with many of the same
issues I am in an ongoing project on oaths and the Constitution. See Richard M. Re,
Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 305 (2016) (drawing from the oath
specific “implications for interpretive methodologies, substantive commitments, and
constitutional change”); Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor,” 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1149, 1153 (2017) (“explor[ing] the possibility that the federal judicial oath calls for some
measure of substantive economic equality” in judicial interpretations of the Constitution).
6. For introductory and basic texts on virtue ethics and the law, see VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE (Collin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); LAW, VIRTUE, AND
JUSTICE (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Virtue,
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 491 (Lorraine Besser-Jones &
Michael Slote eds., 2015); Chapin Cimino, Virtue Jurisprudence, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF VIRTUE 621 (Nancy E. Snow ed., 2018). For a discussion of virtue ethics
and constitutional law, including the role of precedent, see Lawrence B. Solum, The
Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 521 (2004) (listing
adherence to precedent as the first of six basic principles of virtuous constitutional
judging). Recent events are, I venture to suggest, sparking a wider interest among legal
scholars in the role of virtue and character in constitutional officeholding and
constitutional interpretation. For an interesting example, see Sanford Levinson & Mark
A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 145–51 (2018)
(emphasizing the central role of character and virtue in the original constitutional design
and the expectations of its designers, and noting the importance of “integrat[ing] character
and institutions” as opposed to a view of constitutional interpretation that is indifferent to
the character of the actual individuals occupying constitutional offices). Levinson and
Graber suggest that President Donald Trump does not quite manage to embody these
character traits. See id. at 140–45 (offering evidence of “Donald Trump’s gross unfitness
for office”).
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impersonality through the device of personality—properly
understood, channeled, and constrained.
Given space and other constraints, I offer here only a brief
sketch of what such a vision involves, and I do not address the
many sound criticisms that could be made of such a vision,
whether in its details or in its plausibility, especially in
contemporary society.7 My goal is neither to bury nor to praise
Kozel’s theory of precedent. It is to supplement it, by offering one
way to think about how to achieve the “abstract ideal of
impersonal judging” that Kozel sees as one of the central
“promise[s] of precedent” (p. 176).
***
Our constitutional text and culture8 rely on three interrelated
“institutions”9 to achieve sound governance by those holding
offices under the Constitution. This troika of institutions consists
of office, honor, and the oath. I will sketch each institution, and
its relationship to the others, in turn.
Office. The notion of office dates back at least to the
evolution of the concept in ancient Roman law and government.10
The term itself derives from “the classical concept of officium, the
sense of duty belonging to a person with recognized
responsibilities.”11
7. For a preliminary but more detailed discussion, see Paul Horwitz, Honour, Oaths,
and the Rule of Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Some of the material
below draws heavily on that manuscript, which itself flows from my Coxford Lecture on
honor and the rule of law at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law in March
2016.
8. Cf. Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082
(2013) (describing a “‘small-c’ approach” to the Constitution under which American
constitutionalism involves “the web of documents, practices, institutions, norms, and
traditions that structure American government”) (citation omitted).
9. “Institution” is meant here not to refer to specific organizational forms, but to
“commonly accepted norms and understandings that organize behavior in any given
setting over time.” See Michael R. Siebecker, Building a “New Institutional” Approach to
Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247, 259 (2008). It “encompasses individuals, groups,
relationships, and cognitive schemes and frames for constructing them.” Michael J.
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1628
(2004). It can range from “the handshake to marriage to, presumably, sanctioning
regimes.” John R. Sutton, Rethinking Social Control, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 943, 946 (1996)
(reviewing THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W.
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991)).
10. For an especially rich treatment, see J.E. LENDON, EMPIRE OF HONOUR: THE
ART OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ROMAN WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press paperback ed., 2001).
11. Joshua Getzler, An Interdisciplinary View of Fiduciary Law: “As If.”
Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973, 981 (2011) (citing MARCUS
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This conception remains relevant today, despite considerable
change in how (or how strongly) it is viewed. As Steve Sheppard
writes, “The building blocks of a modern legal system are offices,
and the essential purpose of offices is to fulfill tasks of the legal
system.”12 Sheppard defines legal officials as “the individuals in
whom all of the powers of the state are allocated, divided among
many roles.”13 In each case, “the official is both empowered and
limited by the law,” both subject to “the legal obligations
embedded in that particular office by the rules of law” and, within
the scope of that office, possessing substantial “discretion to act
or not to act.”14
This understanding was reflected in English and early
American law, which defined “office” as “ . . . a duty. Although in
general an office was a moral duty, in government it was the
specialized office or duty of a particular government employee or
servant.”15 Although the modern conception of a governmental
office became more bureaucratized over time, and the officer
came to be seen simply as whichever person happens to fill that
office at the moment, it was still essential to the evolving English
understanding of the concept of office that it involved “both a
duty and the position of a particular officer.”16 Thus, Richard
Hutton, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, asked: “What are
the highest places, but obligations of the greatest dewties?”17 “The
citizen who becomes an official” thus “accepts an array of
additional duties that differ from those of [other legal] subjects.”18
Different offices and officers, of course, have different
duties.19 Judges, in particular, have a set of judicial duties that
TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 6 (Arthur L. Humphreys 1902) (44 B.C.E.)).
12. STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF
LEGAL OFFICIALS 10 (2009).
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 20, 21; see also id. at 22 (“[O]ffices have powers that are circumscribed so
that they can only be used toward certain ends at certain times and in certain ways. This
circumscription is established by the same legal obligations that, within these boundaries,
describe the powers the official controls to act according to the official’s substantive
discretion.”).
15. Philip Hamburger, Judicial Office, 6 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 53, 54 (2011).
16. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 104 (2008).
17. Id. at 125 (quoting THE DIARY OF SIR RICHARD HUTTON 1614-1639 (W.R. Prest,
ed., 1991)).
18. SHEPPARD, supra note 12, at 95.
19. Cf. ANDREW SABL, RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC
ETHICS (2002) (discussing the different functions performed by different officers and other
key democratic actors and the different practices and qualities of character required by
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define the judicial office. Modern discussions of judging and
judicial review often speak in terms of judicial authority or power.
A focus on judicial duty, and the limitations it imposes on the
performance of one’s office as a judge, encourages us to think
differently about the judicial role and the relationships of
individual judges to that role and its obligations—including the
obligation to follow precedent.20
Honor. As the ancient and modern writers alike understood
full well, office does not magically transform its occupant into a
Solon or Solomon or divest that person of human frailty. Despite
our attachment to the proposition that ours is “a government of
laws and not of men,”21 the character and virtue of the men and
women who occupy offices was and remains an essential element
of our political and constitutional order.22
As those writers also understood, however, even if we select
virtuous individuals to occupy important offices, they will not
maintain those virtues without powerful motivations. Ambition
and a desire for glory comprise one such motivation: “the love of
fame,” which Hamilton called “the ruling passion of the noblest
minds.”23 Such a motivation is not a virtue in itself, and is as likely
to lead one astray as to keep one on the path of virtue. It must be
channeled productively.
The institution that does so is the love of honor. Honor,
properly understood, is neither merely outward-looking nor
merely the desire for fame. It is the desire to be thought well of
by those whose opinion ought to matter, and the desire
to deserve to be thought well of by those individuals. It is Janusfaced, both inward-and outward-looking. As the anthropologist
Julian Pitt-Rivers defined it:
Honor is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the
eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim,
his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.24

each).
20. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 1–2, 9–14.
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
22. Cf. Levinson & Graber, supra note 6.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST 488 (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
24. JULIAN PITT-RIVERS, HONOUR AND SOCIAL STATUS, IN HONOUR AND SHAME:
THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 19, 22 (J.G. Péristiany ed., 1965) (emphasis
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At its best, honor seeks regard in the eyes of those real or
imagined individuals who are worthy to confer it: what Cicero
called “the agreed approval of good men.”25 Crucially, this desire
is internalized, so that the office holder wants to exemplify the
virtues that ought to accompany earned honor, whether those
virtues are publicly recognized or not. As Adam Smith wrote,
honor involves not just a desire for approval, but “a desire of
being what ought to be approved of.”26 In her invaluable book on
liberalism and honor, Sharon Krause speaks in terms of “a quality
of character, the ambitious desire to live up to one’s code and to
be publicly recognized for doing so.”27 Honor, thus understood, is
both less and more than a virtue. It is a motivation and spur to
virtuous conduct, but one that is experienced internally as the
desire to earn honor properly and virtuously.
As Krause argues, in terms that are highly relevant to the
question of what will provide judges with the personal
motivations that will convince them to honor precedent and thus
value “impersonality” highly, this conception of honor may be
more rather than less urgent in our contemporary, egalitarian
democratic society. A strong motivation is needed if
in original).
25. PETER OLSTHOORN, HONOR IN POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 24 (2015)
(quoting CICERO, Tusculanae Disputationes III.3–4).
26. Id. at 8 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS III.2.7:
Oxford Clarendon Press 1976) (1759)) (emphasis added).
27. SHARON KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 2 (2002). Krause’s book is
essential reading for those who are interested in the value and viability of honor in
contemporary liberal democracies, and is the leading edge of a number of recent writings
constituting what we might call modern “honor studies.” A short list, in alphabetical order,
would include: KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL
REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010); ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM, MODERN HONOR: A
PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE (2013); KRAUSE, supra note 27; OLSTHOORN, supra note 25;
ROBERT L. OPRISKO, HONOR: A PHENOMENOLOGY (2012); WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS,
HONOR FOR US: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE (2010);
BRUCE CRAIG SMITH, AMERICAN HONOR: THE CREATION OF THE NATION’S IDEALS
DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (2018); TAMLER SOMMERS, WHY HONOR
MATTERS (2018); FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR (1994); JEREMY WALDRON,
DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012) (comparing honor and
dignity); ALEXANDER WELSH, WHAT IS HONOR?: A QUESTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES
(2008). Also relevant to the study of honor, although I make no use of it here, is Stephen
Darwall’s philosophical work on so-called “second-personal ethics.” See STEPHEN
DARWALL, MORALITY, AUTHORITY, AND LAW: ESSAYS IN SECOND-PERSONAL ETHICS
I (2013); STEPHEN DARWALL, HONOR, HISTORY, AND RELATIONSHIP: ESSAYS IN
SECOND-PERSONAL ETHICS II (2013); STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2009). A recent edited
collection provides an excellent survey of the field. See HONOR IN THE MODERN WORLD:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Laurie M. Johnson & Dan Demetriou eds., 2016).
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officeholders—including judges—are to exhibit qualities of virtue
and excellence. That motivation must be especially strong where
doing so might conflict with their own substantive views of law or
justice, or deprive them of opportunities to put their own stamp
on the law and gain some measure of glory. In her argument,
“liberal honor” fills that role. It supplies the basis for the personal
agency that can bring out these qualities in the individual and give
him or her the strength of character to maintain them in the face
of contrary pressures.
At least since Peter Berger, drawing on a long set of historical
developments, wrote about the “obsolescence of the concept of
honor,” honor has been widely viewed with suspicion or outright
hostility. In particular, it has been unfavorably compared with the
democratic quality of equal human dignity.28 But demanding
honorable conduct from our highest officials, and encouraging in
them a sense of honor, is not incompatible with a belief in equal
human dignity. Indeed, encouraging honor as a motivation for
officeholders may be necessary, supplying the energy and agency
that will lead officeholders to maintain a legal and political regime
in which human dignity is forcefully defended and advanced. For
the purposes of Kozel’s book, that includes the desire to treat
cases “impersonally,” respecting the equal dignity of litigants by
treating them similarly, rather than treating like cases differently
or departing from precedent based on a judge’s personal view of
the parties in a particular case.
Oath. In our constitutional system, the device that ties
individual honor to the ostensibly “impersonal” office, and that
encourages honor properly understood and internalized rather
than the mere love of fame, is the oath. Most or all officials take
an oath to defend the Constitution,29 and judges take oaths that
commit them to a particular vision of justice and judicial duty.30

28. See PETER BERGER, ON THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF HONOUR,
reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). See also
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
225–56 (1989).
29. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”). I place oaths and affirmations on
equal footing here and refer generically to the “oath.”
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 453 (1990); Re, supra note 5, at 1166 n.89 (citing examples of state
constitutional provisions providing for judicial oaths).
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The oath serves multiple functions. It is a prerequisite to and
a performative act for taking office.31 It solemnizes the act of
taking office and commits the oath-taker to act faithfully to fulfill
the duties, and observe the limits, of that office.32 And it is
a publicly performed act, one that ties the oath-taker to public
regard and calls on him or her to maintain the approval and avoid
the disapprobation of both his or her peers—or “honor group”—
and the wider public community he or she serves.33
Despite its religious roots in calling on God to witness the
promise, the oath is no more magical a device than office itself.
But it is or can be—or ought to be—a powerful, even
transformative, device. It serves as a linchpin. It connects the
individual to the office and the officeholder to the commitment to
act honorably. The oath thus provides a deeply personal motive
and wellspring for the commitment to “impersonality” in judicial
office. It is tied to both an internalized personal sense of honor
and a desire to be seen by one’s peers and others as having acted
honorably. To be sure, these qualities, and the oath that serves to
connect them to the individual and the office, are aspirational and
rarely completely fulfilled. It is imperfect. But that does not make
it unimportant or a mere fiction.34
31. See, e.g., JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF
LAWLESS JUDGING 155 (2010). For a rich discussion of the oath, including its performative
nature, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE SACRAMENT OF LANGUAGE: AN ARCHAEOLOGY
OF THE OATH (Adam Kotsko trans., 2011).
32. See, e.g., Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers’ Generation: A
Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 276; HAMBURGER, supra note
16, at 109; Daniel P. Sulmasy, What is an Oath and Why Should a Physician Swear One?,
20 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 329, 332 (1999).
33. See Sulmasy, supra note 32, at 332; Sheppard, supra note 32, at 107;
HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106–08.
34. At least judges say they take the oath seriously and are impressed by the
solemnity of the act. See, e.g., Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, Judge Frank J. Battisti and the
Promises He Kept, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 367, 367 (1994) (“Judge Battisti viewed the oath
of office very seriously. Swearing-in ceremonies were important to him and he presided
with great solemnity over them. He considered the assumption of public office to be on
par with the undertaking of a sacred trust.”). The language here is strikingly similar to the
discussion above of offices, which have been described as “‘trusts’ to be executed by public
officials,” and which are “bound on the conscience” of the oath-taker as a kind of fiduciary
duty. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 93 (1988) (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 191 (Robert Rutland, ed., 1983)). Not incidentally to the office- and
virtue-based approach taken here, a recent strain of public law literature emphasizes the
fiduciary nature of public officials in constitutional systems and seeks to draw implications
for judging and other official actions. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A
GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION
(2017); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY
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***
This vision of the troika of office, honor, and the oath is
intended as a modest supplement to Kozel’s careful account of
precedent. It may place a different gloss on his emphasis on
“continuity, constraint, and impersonality” as the core judicial
ideals (p. 4). To paraphrase Justice Blackmun, it suggests that in
order to achieve judicial impersonality we must first take account
of personality—of the motivations that give judges the agency and
energy to strive for impersonality in a personal world.35 It
certainly does not demand, however, that we reject Kozel’s
emphasis on the importance of impersonality in judging and the
law of precedent.
Neither, unfortunately, does it tell us how to resolve the
difficult questions and compromises that are involved in Kozel’s
account—or any account—of judicial precedent. It does not tell
us when or how to respect and observe, to reject, or to modify a
particular precedent. But it may offer a way of thinking about
the judicial oath, the judicial office, and the relationship of both
to precedent and its difficulties. That way of thinking may help
raise useful questions about both Kozel’s book and the judicial
task itself.
In possible tension with Kozel’s desire to find an approach to
precedent that is compatible with “interpretive pluralism” on the
Supreme Court (pp. 11-17), a virtue-based approach grounded in
the troika of office, honor, and oath suggests that each judge, in
taking the oath, faces an indefeasible obligation to reflect on what
the judicial office and judicial duty demand, and to follow that
(2012); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
513 (2015); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael Sirota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the
Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004). For critiques, see, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Stephen
R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); Seth Davis,
The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014).
In this review symposium, Professor Allison Orr Larsen usefully examines
various existing or proposed practices on the Supreme Court that can entrench and
enhance this perspective and encourage judicial “norms of impersonality.” Allison Orr
Larsen, Supreme Court Norms of Impersonality, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 373 (2018).
Professor Larsen’s contribution surely has far more immediate practical value than mine.
But both can be read together productively, inasmuch as her article offers concrete means
of encouraging and holding judges to the higher-level but more abstract virtue-based
approach that I argue for here.
35. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race.”).
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vision faithfully.36 But in connecting that indefeasible personal
obligation to a sense of office that focuses on duty and constraint
rather than power, it requires a commitment to an office-centered
vision of justice, rather than one that is strictly personal or
idiosyncratic. That commitment may require obedience to
precedent, and self-restraint in the face of a desire to radically
reshape the law or remake it in one’s own image of justice. It
requires the judge to “do the office of a Judge, and to receive
information by witnesses and solemnities of law, and . . . not to
bring his own private conscience to become the public measure.”37
And, through the oath, it connects that obedience to
the individual judge’s personal and official honor: to his or her
desire to be, and be seen to be, a loyal and virtuous officeholder
and oath-keeper.
For better and worse, there is nothing mechanical or exact
about this vision. It does not answer the questions that Kozel asks,
or that flow from a careful examination of his description of and
prescriptions for the law of judicial precedent. But it may suggest
that we should view those questions differently: perhaps
differently than Kozel does, and certainly differently than our
contemporary legal and political culture generally does. It
suggests that the impersonality Kozel seeks is and must be
powerfully and ineluctably personal. And it calls on us, and our
culture, to revisit, perhaps to revise, but most vitally to recommit
ourselves to the importance, even in our contemporary egalitarian
and dignitarian culture, of virtue, honor, office, and the oath.

36. See Paul Horwitz, Honor’s Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential
Transitions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074–77 (2009) (discussing the indefeasibility of the
oath-taker’s responsibility in the context of the presidential oath).
37. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 164 (quoting JEREMY TAYLOR, DUCTOR
DUBITANTUM, OR THE RULE OF CONSCIENCE IN ALL HER GENERAL MEASURES 82
(James Flesher ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1660)).

